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Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
ABSTRACT
It is sometimes suggested that compensation varies across individuals
much more dramatically than would be expected by looking at variations in
their marginal products. This paper argues that a compensation scheme
based on an individual's relative position within the firm rather than his
absolute level of output will, under certain circumstances, be the preferred
and natural outcome of a competitive economy. Differences in the level of
output between individuals may be quite small, yet optimal "prizes" are
selected in a way that induces workers to allocate their effort and invest-
ment activities efficiently.
In particular, by compensating workers on the basis of their relative
position in the firm, one can produce the same incentive structure for risk-
neutral workers that the optimal and efficient pie~e rate produces. It might
be less costly however, to observe relative position than to measure the
level of each worker's output directly. This results in the payment of
prizes, wages which for some workers greatly exceeds their presumed marginal
products. When risk aversion is introduced, the prize salary structure no
longer duplicates the allocation of resources induced by the optimal piece
rate. For activities which have a high degree of inherent riskiness, pay-
ment based on relative position will dominate.
Finally, when workers are allowed to be heterogeneous, an important
result is obtained. Competitive contests which pay workers on the basis of
their relative position will not, in general, sort workers in a way which
yields an efficient allocation of resources. In particular, low quality
workers will attempt to contaminate a firm comprised of high quality workers,
even in the absence of production complimentarities. This suggests that










It is a familiar proposition in labor economics that under competitive
conditions workers are paid the value of their marginal products. In order
for this statement to be meaningful, it is apparent (see Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972) that some mechanism exist for ascertaining and monitoring
productivity. If inexpensive reliable monitors are available, the optimal
compensation method is a periodic wage that pays on the basis of observed
input. However, when the firm cannot monitor input as closely as the worker
can, compensation based on input that the firm actually observes invites
shirking by workers and may be inefficient. In these cases, the situation
can be improved if rewards are based on output, so long as that is more
easily observed by both parties. It is true that compensation geared to
, input is generally superior to that based on output when monitoring costs
are negligible, because workers must bear more risk in an incentive contract
than in a wage contract, creating gains from trade if the firm is less risk-
averse than are its employees. Nevertheless, when monitoring is not free,
the gain in efficiency from output or incentive payments may outweigh the
loss of utility due to additional risk-bearing of workers.
A wide variety of incentive payment schemes are used in practice and
one of them, simple piece rates, has been extensively analyzed (e.g., see
Cheung (1969), Stiglitz (1975), Mirrlees (1976)). In this paper we consider
another type of incentive payment, namely contest and prizes, that has not
been analyzed very much, yet which seem to be prevalent, either implicitly
or explicitly, in many labor contracts. The main difference between
prizes and other types of incentive compensation is that in a2
contest earnings depend on rank order among a group of workers, whereas
piece rates typically are paid on the basis of individual performance. 1
The prototype contest is the tennis match, where winning and losing prizes
are fixed in advance, independently of each player's performance in that
particular contest.
The analysis of alternative compensation schemes is related to the
problem of moral hazard and providing appropriate incentives for eliciting
effort and investment when information is costly and monitoring costs are
asymmetric. Each type of compensation method is characterized by certain
parameters, such as the piece rate, the prize structure and so forth. For
each scheme we seek the values of the parameters that maximize utility of
workers, subject to a zero profit constraint for competitive firms. For
familiar reasons, the scheme that actually emerges in competitive markets
achieves the unconditional maximum utility of workers among the set of
conditional maximums. Two dimensions of incentives need to be distinguished:
one is investment or skill acquisition prior to the time a work activity is
entered and the other is the effort expended, after skills have been
acquired, in a given work situation or play of the game. In this work we
concentrate on the first and ignore the second. The emphasis on prior
investment lends itself most readily to an interpretation of earnings
prospects over the whole life cycle, or lifetime rather than annual earnings.
Section II demonstrates that two-player tournaments achieve the same
allocation of resources as piece rates when workers are risk-neutral.
Therefore, choice between the two forms of payment depends on costs of
assessing rank rather than individual performance. These issues are
important for the structure of executive pay. Section III extends these3
results to N-player tournaments; sequential tournaments with eliminations,
which give rise to skewed realized reward structures; and to problems where
rank rather than total output is valued by consumers. Section IV shows the
very surprising result that tournaments can be the social optimum contract
when workers are risk-averse. This is applied to a problem originally
formulated by Friedman (1951) on the relation between skewness in the
overall earnings distribution and workers' preferences for lotteries.
Section V discusses problems of adverse selection in tournaments in the
presence of population heterogeneity and asymmetric information, and the
economic structure of handicapping systems when these differences are known
to everyone.
II. PIECE RATES AND TOURNAMENTS WITH RISK-NEUTRALITY
A. Piece Rates
Consider the simplest linear production structure in which worker j
produces (lifetime) output qj according to
where ~ is the worker's precommitted choice of investment in the activity
(a measure of skill) and € is a random or luck component drawn out of a
known distribution with 2 E(€.) = o.
J
Production requires only labor and
production risk is completely diversifiable for firms, so entrepreneurs act
as expected value maximizers, or as if they were risk-neutral. Notice that
this production structure, which is maintained throughout, specifies that a
worker's product is a random variable, but that the mean of the probability4
distribution can be affected by the worker's own actions. The incentive
mechanism is designed to elicit the optimum value of ~, or to choose the
"correct" distribution. Analysis of the case where workers can also affect
variance is left for some other occasion.
The piece rate solution is very simple to analyze in this case. Let
the piece rate be r. Ignoring discounting, the worker's net income is
rq - ~(~), where C(jJ) is the cost of producing skill level jJ, with
C' and C" > O.. Risk-neutral workers choose jJ to maximize
which, for given r, implies C'(jJ) =r: investment equates marginal cost
and marginal return. Let the firm sell the output on a competitive market
at price Then expected profit is
E(Vq - rq) = (V - r)jJ
so entry and competition for workers bids up the piece rate to r = V.
This implies, in conjunction with the worker's investment criteria, that
(2) C'(jJ) = V
Therefore the marginal cost of investment equals its social return, the
4 standard result that piece rates are efficient.
B•.Rank-Order Tournaments
Now consider a two-player tournament in which the rules of the game
specify a fixed prize WI to the winner and a fixed prize W 2 to the loser.
Production of each player, j and k, follows (1), with €:.,i=j,k
~5
independently and identically distributed, and E(E:.) = 0
1. and
Th~ winner is determined by the largest drawing of q. The contest is
rank-order because the margin of winning does not affect earnings.
Contestants precommit their investment strategy knowing the rules of the
game and the prizes and do not communicate or collude during the investment
period. We seek the competitive equilibrium prize structure (W1,WZ) .
. Consider the contestant's problem, assuming that both have the same
costs of investment C(~), so that their behavior is identical. A
contestant's expected utility (wealth) is
P(Wl - C(~» + (1 - P)(WZ - C(~»
(3) = PWI + (1 - P)WZ - C(~)
where P is the probability of winning. The probability that j wins is
P = prob(qj > qk) = prob(~j - ~ > E:k - E:
j
)
(4) - prob(~j - ~k > ~) = G(~j - ~)
where ~ = E:k - E:
j
• ~ ~ g(~), G(o)
= zcrZ (because E: and E:
E: j k
is the cdf of g(~), E(~) = 0 and
are i.i.d.). Each player chooses ~i
to maximize (3), which requires, assuming interior solutions,
(WI - W Z)




(WI - W Z)
aZp _
C"(~.) < 0 Z 1.
a~i
We adopt the Nash-Cournot assumptions that each player optimizes
against the optimum investment of his opponent.(or he plays against the
market over which he has no influence). This is perhaps justified6
because investment is precommitted, each player is a small part of the
market and does not know the identity of his opponent at the time investment
decisions are made. Thus j takes ~ as given in determining his
investment and conversely for k. It then follows from (4) that, for player
j
which upon substitution into (5) yields j's reaction function
Player k's
reversed.
reaction function looks the same except with ~j and
The symmetry of (6) implies that when the Nash solution exists
~j = ~k and P = G(O) =~. However, it is not necessarily true that there
is a solution because with arbitrary density functions the objective function
(3) may not be concave in the relevant range.5 It is possible to show that
a solution exists provided that cr2 is sufficiently large, i.e., contests e:
are feasible only when the variance of chance is large enough. This result
accords with intuition and is in the spirit of the old saying that a
(sufficient) difference of opinion is necessary for a horse race. Technical
details are slightly tedious and therefore are relegated to an appendix.
Existence of an equilibrium is assumed in all that follows.
Substituting ~j = ~k at the Nash equilibrium equation (6) reduces to
(7) i = j ,k
so each player's investment depends on the spread between winning and losing
prizes. The levels of the prizes only influence the decision to enter the7
game and the players' expected rent if entry is profitable. The condition
for entry is that maximum expected utility be nonnegative. With P = ~
equation (3) becomes
which simply says that expected winnings at the best investment strategy
must be at least as large as opportunity cost if workers are to enter the
tournament.
The risk-neutral firm is more passive. Its actual gross receipts are
(qj + qk)'V and its ~osts are the total prize money WI + W Z• Competition
for labor bids up the purse to the point where expected total receipts equal
costs, or WI + W z = (~j + ~k) ·V.
the zero profit condition reduces to
But since ~ = ~ = ~ j k in equilibrium,
Therefore the expected value of product equals the expected prize in
equilibrium. Substituting (8) into the worker's utility function (3) with
P = ~ in equilibrium, the worker's expected utility at the optimum
investment strategy is
(9) V~ - C(~).
The equilibrium prize structure selects WI and W 2 to maximize (9) or
(10) i = 1,2
and the marginal cost of investment equals its social marginal return,
v = C'(~), in the tournament as well as the piece rate. So competitive
tournaments, like piece rates, are efficient and both result in exactly
the same allocation of resources.8
To summarize the analysis, the problem for the firm is to choose a
prize structure (W1,W2) that maximizes profits. The decision by
individuals to invest in skill or effort (~) depends upon the spread
between winning and losing. As the spread increases, the incentive to
devote additional resources to improving one's probability of winning
increases. The firm would like to increase the spread and thereby induce
higher productivity "play" (which increases the firm's revenue). However,
as the spread increases contestants invest more, but their costs are
increased as well. The latter is what limits the spread. A firm offering
too large a spread induces excessive investment. A competing firm can
attract all the workers by·decreasing the spread, because it lowers workers'
costs by more than it lowers expected earnings and therefore raises expected
utility. If the marginal cost of skill acquisition is increasing, there is
a unique equilibrium spread between the prizes that maximizes expected
utility.
Some further manipulation of the equilibrium conditions yields an
interesting interpretation in terms of the theory of agency (see Ross (1972),
Becker and Stigler (1974) and Harris and Raviv (1978». Solve (7) and (8)
for WI and W 2 to obtain
WI = V~ + C'(~)/2g(O) = V~ + V/2g(O)
(11)
W z = V~ - C'(~)/2g(O) = V~ - V/2g(O)
The second equality follows from V = C'(~). Now think of the term
C'(~)/2g(O) or V/Zg(O) in (11) as an entrance fee or bond that is
p~ted by each player. The winning and losing prizes payoff the marginal9
value product plus or minus the entrance fee. That is, the players receive
their marginal product combined with a fair winner-take-all gamble over the
total entrance fees or bonds. The appropriate social investment incentives
are given by each contestant's attempt to win the gamble. This contrasts
with the main agency result, where the bond is returned to each worker
after a satisfactory performance has been observed. There the incentive
mechanism works through the employee's attempts to work hard enough to
recoup his own bond. Here it works through the attempts to win the contest.
Let us conclude this part of the discussion with some comparative
statics, all of.which follow from the marginal conditions (10) and the
worker's investment decision (7). These two imply also that
We first see what happens when the distribution of luck is changed.
From (7), all that matters about the random variables is the value of the
distribution of ~ at ~ = 0, or g(O). It is clear, however, from the
definition ~= Ek - E. that a reduction in the variance of luck 02
J E
concentrates the pdf of ~ around zero so that g(O) increases. For
example, if E is normal then g(O) = 1/21 'IT02 and ag(O)/aO
E < O. Yet
E
condition (10) shows that the optimal investment is independent of the
higher moments of the distribution of chance for risk-neutral workers:
marginal cost equals marginal return irrespective of g(~) so long as
E(~) = O. Therefore a reduction in luck does not change the quality of
the contestants. It does reduce the spread (WI - W 2), from (12).
Equation (11) shows also that WI falls and W 2 rises, i.e., the total
entrance fees decline and the size of the gamble falls. The reason is10
that a given incremental investment buys each player a smaller incremental
probability when luck is more important. The stakes must therefore increase
to give contestants the proper marginal incentives to invest. This implies
that among risk-neutral workers the optimal prizes are closer together in
occupations that are inherently less riskY~ Note that paying by the piece
gives a similar result.
There are only two other exogenous factors in this problem: parameters
of the cost function, C(]..I), and V. From condit.ion (12) the spread is
independent of costs for a given value of V. However, anything that
increases marginal costs must reduce investment since V = C'(]..l). From (11),
this condition implies no reduction in the entrance fee, which remains at
V/Zg(O), but a reduction in the "certain income" V']..I. Both prizes are
reduced by the same amount because the lower total product cannot support
the same total prize money.7 An increase in V with given costs raises
investment since its value has increased, from (10). The incentive to
invest more is signalledby an increase in the spread, from (lZ). Greater
total productivity also supports a larger total purse WI + W Z' Equation
(11) implies that W 1 must increase, but W z need not rise. The entrance
fee and magnitude of the gamble are incr.,ased in any case, which is another
way of saying that investment incentives rise.
Finally, there is an important practical implication of these results.
While it remains true from the zero profit condition (8) that ex ante
expected wages equal expected marginal product in a tournament, the actual
realized earnings definitely do not equal marginal productivity in either
an ex ante or ex post sense. Consider ex ante first. Since ]..lj = ]..Ik = ']..I,
expected marginal products are equal. So long as W 1
> W z' which it must11
to induce any investment, the payment that j receives never equals the
payment that k receives. It is impossible that the prize is equal to
ex ante marginal product, because ex ante marginal products are equal.
It is equally obvious that wages are not equal to ex post marginal products.
Actual marginal product for j is Vqj rather than V~j. But qj is a
random variable, the value of which is not known until after the game is
played~ while Wi and W 2 · are fixed in advance. Only under the rarest
coincidence would Wi = vqj and W 2 = Vqk. Therefore, wages do not equal
ex post marginal products.
C. Comparisons
All compensation schemes can be viewed as transforms of the distribution
of productivity into the distribution of earnings. The piece rate of
Section II.A is a linear transform and apart from a change in the mean and
a change in scale, the earnings distribution absolutely follows the
distribution of output. The tournament in Section II.B is an entirely
different animal. It is a distinctly nonlinear transformation that converts
the continuous distribution of productivity into a discrete binomial
distribution of earnings. In spite of this difference, we have shown that
a competitive prize-tournament structure duplicates the allocation of
resources achieved by a piece rate structure, when workers are risk-neutral.
This is clear from examination of conditions (2) and (10). In both cases
the fundamental marginal condition is the same: V = ct(~) so investment
is the same. The reason for this is that risk-neutral workers only care
about the first moment of the earnings distribution and in both cases that
is given by V~ - C(~), where ~ is determined by (2) or (10). EvenIi
though the higher moments differ, those differences do not affect expected
ut~lity or wealth. In Section IV we analyze cases where workers are risk-
averse. There, preferences for higher order moments in addition to the
mean serve to break the tie between the two schemes on the grounds of
tastes alone.
Nevertheless, we believe that even in the risk-neutral setting there
are important factors that influence the choice between the two. Chief
among them are possible differences in costs of information. If rank is
more easily observed than each individual's level of output, tournaments
dominate piece rates. On the other hand, occupations in which an
individual's output level is easily observed would have no particular
preference for a prize scheme. For example, salesmen whose output is
easily observed are paid by piece rates, whereas many business executives,
whose output is much more difficult to observe, engage in contests.
Consider the salary structure for executives. It appears as though
the salary of, say, the vice-president of a particular corporation is
substantially below that of the president of that same corporation. Yet
presidents are often chosen from the ranks of vice-presidents. On the day
that a given individual is promoted from vice-president to president, his
salary may triple. It is difficult to argue that his skills have tripled
in that one-day period, presenting difficulties for standard theory, where
supply factors should keep wages in those two occupations approximately
equal. It is not a puzzle, however, when interpreted in the context of a
prize. If the president of a corporation is viewed as the winner of a
match and as such receives the higher prize, WI' then that wage payment
is settled upon not only because it reflects his current productivity as13
president, but rather because it induces that individual and all other
individuals to perform appropriately when they are in more junior positions.
This interpretation suggests that presidents of large corporations do not
necessarily earn high wages because they are more productive as presidents,
but because this particular type of payment 'structure makes them more
productive over their entire working life. A contest provides the proper
incentives for skill acquisition prior to coming into the position~
III. RISK-NEUTRALITY: SOME EXTENSIONS
This section extends the analysis to N players and also discusses some
aspects of sequential contests.
A. Several Contestants
It is easy to show that the formal equivalence between piece rates and
tournaments is not an artifact of two-player games, when all players are
risk-neutral and have identical costs. players and
prizes, W. for i th place.
~
worker's expected utility is
N
(13) EPiWi - C(~)
Let there be N




Since the players are identical, the Nash solution, if it exists, implies
Pi = l/N for all i and for all players. Therefore (13) becomes, in
equilibrium,
(14) (EW.)/N - C(~)
~14
However, for zero expected profit, the total purse must be exactly supported
N
by expected revenues. Expected revenue is E(6Vq.) = NV~, so competitive
~
equilibrium requires 6W. = NV~.
~ Substituting into (14), each worker acts
to maximize V~ - C(~). That is, ~ is chosen to satisfy V = C'(~) just
as in the two-player case. Therefore a tournament is efficient independent
of the number of players.
There is a curious feature of the N-player case that only first and
last place prizes are uniquely determined in competitive equilibrium. This
is sufficiently nonobvious that it is worth discussing, but requires a few
details and is therefore relegated to appendix 2. This indeterminacy is a
feature of the risk neutral case and vanishes when risk aversion is intro-
duced.
B. Sequential Contests
This section considers a few aspects of sequential games. Before
doing so, it is necessary to clarify a possible point of confusion between
what might be labeled repetitive and sequential contests.
1. Repetitive games
The point at issue concerns the proper interpretation of the stochastic
term E in the output technology q = jl + E. As stated at the outset,
we think of as investment and of q as lifetime output. There-
fore E must be interpreted as "lifetime luck"; or alternatively as
a drawing out of a known distribution of life-persistent person effects or15
ability whose realization is unknown to all agents at the time investment
decisions and contracts are drawn up. On this interpretation, € is
revealed only very slowly, and strictly speaking in the .formal model above,
at the end of the lifetime. Clearly, there is only a single period or one-
time tournament in a whole lifetime, though the "period" is a long one to
be sure.
In repetitive play one might think of a series of, say, annual contests.
This stands in the same relation to a single lifetime contest as a compound
lottery does to a simple lottery. Let annual output be written
Suppose now that €t is i.i.d.-- qt = Jl + €t' where t is a year index.
2 2
E(€t) = 0, E(€t) = cr and E(€t€s) = 0 for t + s . In this case has
the interpretation of "pure luck." In this case also, however, annual risk
is diversifiable by each worker over his lifetime, e.g., by using a saving
account, since a good outcome in a given year is likely to be offset by an
equally poor outcome in some other year. The point is that with sufficient
repetition and independent error all risk would be diversified away,
for basically the same reasons that the sample standard deviation of the mean
of a distribution shrinks to zero as the sample size increases. Incottle could
be made constant over the lifetime and the tournament structure would unravel.
Consequently, in order for a tournament to make sense there must be
some risk that is nondiversifiable by the worker and that is revealed only
9 relatively slowly. Put in another way, € is the remaining element of
chance after all independent components have been diversified through
repetition. The simplest error structure consistent with this requirement
is a variance-component specification €it = 0i + nit' where i refers to
persons and t to years. Clearly, we have nothing to say about risk that
the worker can diversify himself.16
2. Sequential games: information and skew
The main interest of sequential contests is their possible use in
gaining information about the undiversifiable chance component in lifetime
productivity. The analogy with sequential statistical analysis is suggestive
of how € (or 0 in the variance-component) comes to be revealed. We
cannot do justice to this complicated problem here and the following brief
ff. 10 comments must su ~ce.
Contests with eliminations give rise to a skewed income distribution.
Consider sequential two-player games starting with N players. A winner
is selected through a series of paired contests, "quarter-finals," "semi-
finals," and "finals." The first round consists of N/2 two-person matches:
N/2 players lose, earning W 21 . N/2 win, receiving W II plus the
opportunity to advance to the next round. In the second round N/4 are
losers and N/4 are winners. So N/4 end up with W II + W 22 and N/4
get W II + W I2 plus the opportunity to advance to the next round. The
final distribution of income has N/2 with W 21 ; N/4 with W ll + W 22 ;
Z
N/8 with Wil + W I2 + W 23 , etc., and the winner, with L W as income,
t=1 It
where Z = in N/in 2. This distribution has positive skew.
A plausible story can be told which yields sequential contests and
skew. Returning to the point that rank may be less costly to determine
than individual outputs, suppose further that it is cheaper to determine
relative position in a two-person game than in a multi-person game. Let
0i be an unobserved ability component for player i, with neither
contestants nor firms taking this into account when selecting an optimal ~
because it is unobserved at the time of investment. Then
where n is pure luck and t th refers to the t17
contest. If we want to select the players with the largest ~ + ° it also
pays to have only winners play winners, since
Therefore a sequential elimination tournament may be a cost-efficient way
of selecting the best person.ll
Information about prior outcomes influences wage rates and prizes in
sequential games. To illustrate, let production take place in two periods
and consider a two-player contest played in period 1 only. The winner
receives (W11 ,WI2) in periods 1 and 2 respectively and the loser gets
(WZ1 ,WZ2)' Ignoring discounting for simplicity, lifetime income is
WI = W 11 + W 12 for the winner and W z = W Z1 + W 22 for the loser. Each
player chooses ~ before the game is played to maximize expected wealth
PW1 + (1 - P)W2
C(~) and the Nash solution is identical to Section II.B:
C'(~) = g(O) (WI - W 2). The budget constraint is only slightly altered to
WI + W z = 4V~, so in competitive equilibrium WI and W z are basically
the same as before, though twice as large because production takes place
over two periods instead of one.
12
If workers are not bound to the same firm over their lifetime then
competition would bid up the second period wage of the winner to the
expected value of the second or largest order statistic:
W 12
:I E(Vqj21j wins) = V~ + VE(oj Iqj1 > qkl) , where qil is first-period
production and qi2 is second-period production of player i. The reason
is that a competing firm, knowing a game had been played, could infer the
second-period conditional expectation of the winner's product simply by
knowing his identity. The same logic implies W Z2 = E(vqjZlj loses) =
V~ + E(ojlqjl < qkl). If the firm organizing the contest attempted to18
ensure that the winner stayed by paying more than E(VQj2!j wins), it
would have to pay less than the conditional expectation to the loser.
Competition for losers would make the firm unactuarial in period 2 and
invite bankruptcy. With W 12 and W 22 fixed by their conditional
expectation, W ll and W 21 are determined to be consistent with the
competitive game equilibrium comditions on gross wealth WI and W 2, the
firm is actuarially balanced period by period and it makes no difference
if the players depart or not in period 2. One can even imagine the
existence of firms whose major activity is running contests among young
workers (period i) that provide sorting and information services for other
firms for older workers (period 2), minor leagues in a sense. This is
essentially financed by the workers themselves in the manner of the
entrance fees discussed in Section II. This places restrictions on the
shape of the "age-earnings" profile, but there remains an element of in-
determinacy to the prize or wage in each period, though not to wea.lth,
and W 13
2'
C. Rank-Order Objective Functions
It is of some interest to note that the fundamental solution to the
tournament prize structure survives a broad class of alternative specifi-
cations of the revenue function. Consider a horse race. The criterion
v . (Uj + Uk) assumes that gate receipts are proportional to the total or
average speed in the race. It may be that spectators also care about rank
as well as overall speed. Let Qi be the expected value of the speed of19
the i th place horse (an order statistic). If spectator's willingness
to pay depends on the expected quality of the winning horse, revenue is
instead of So long as win and place prizes
so gate receipts also depend is the cdf of then of
and W 2 are the stakes, contestants still behave exactly as in Section II:
~ is the same for both and depends on the spread. If F(e) is the cdf
F2
(Q -~) 1
on the spread through its influence on the distribution of the winner's
expected speed. The competitive prize structure still maximizes contestants'
expected utility but the zero profit constraint is somewhat altered from the
above. However, only the details differ: The equilibrium spread solves the
maximum problem and the prize levels satisfy the constraint. Similar
considerations apply if revenue depends on Q1 and Q 2 so that spectators
care about expected speeds of both ranks and on the closeness of the contest.
Notice that since the revenue function always involves ~,there always
exists an alternative piece rate scheme: For example, each horse could be
paid in proportion to its speed. Therefore virtually the same issues of
comparison arise as those considered above: Even if revenue depends on rank
the optimum compensation method need not depend on rank.
As anhistorical note, one of the few papers we have been able to find
on the prize structure in tournaments is by Sir Francis Galton (1902).15
Galton considered a race with n-contestants where a fixed sum was to be
divided among the first two places. With prizes W 1 and W 2 Galton
proposed the following division on strictly a priori grounds20
That is, the ratio of first to second prize stands in the same relation as
th~ corresponding expected rank-order differences over third place. This
criterion is roughly related to expected relative outcomes or productivity.
Galton's work is an important paper in statistics but is less interesting
to economists because it does not take account of a contestant's incentive to
run fast. His contest is a random draw of a sample of size n from a fixed
population. By contrast, the crucial aspect of our work is in allowing the
prize structure to change the population distributions through incentives to
invest. The population distributions are therefore endogenous in our model
but exogenous in his model. Nonetheless, Galton went on to show the
remarkable result that (Ql - Q3)/(Q2 - Q3) is approximately 3.0 independent
of n when the parent distribution is normal. Therefore his criterion leads
to a highly skewed prize structure. This result would perhaps be less
surprising today, given what is known about the characteristic skew of
extreme value distributions, yet it does roughly concur with the prize
structures commonly observed in sports activities such as tennis and horse
racing. Skew is not necessarily an implication of a single n-player contest
in our model, though it is not inconsistent with it. We believe, however,
that skewed prizes in each play of a repetitive game structure may be a
strong implication of the incentive to elicit effort in each round and that
dimension has been ignored here.21
IV. OPTIMAL PRIZE STRUCTURE WITH RISK-AVERSION
In the previous section, we obtained the surprising result that
contests and piece-rate compensation schemes yield identical and efficient
allocations of resources. In this section, we allow for risk-aversion of
contestants and show that the choice of compensation scheme is no longer
indeterminate. Even when costs of ascertaining output are zero, the
piece-rate scheme tends to dominate for distributions of € with low
variance, while prizes tend to dominate for high variance distributions.
The reason is roughly as follows: In a piece-rate scheme, players are
paid a fixed sum (to be determined optimally) plus some proportion of their
output. The higher is the variance in chance, €j' the higher will tend
to be the variance in income (although this can be offset by reducing the
variable and increasing the fixed part of the payment). A prize structure
truncates the extremes of the distribution by converting it to a binomial.
However, the necessity of a positive spread in the prize structure implies
that there must be some variance in income. For small 2 a ,
€ it appears as
though the variance introduced by the requisite spread exceeds that which
results from paying by the piece. But as 2 a gets large, higher expected
€
utility is produced by fixing maximum gain and loss in advance with prizes
than by taking one's chance and allowing €j to affect wages strongly.
The fixed component would have to be so high relative to the variable
piece component in the piece rate that investment incentives are too small
and prizes dominate.22
A. Optimum Linear Piece Rate 16
The piece-rate scheme analyzed pays workers a fixed amount, I, plus
rq, where r is piece rate per unit of output. The problem for the firm
J
is to pick an r, I vector that maximizes workers' expected utility




y:: I + rq - C(1l )
- I + rll + r8 - C(ll)
and 8(y) is the pdf of y. Since V~ is expected revenue from a worker
and I + r~ is expected wage payments, the zero profit market constraint is
(17) V~ := I + r~ .
The worker's problem is to choose ~ to maximize expected utility, given
r· and r. If € '" f (€) , the worker's problem is
Max E(U) := fU(I + r~ + r€ - C(~»f(€)d€ •
~
The first-order condition is
aEa~U) = f[U'(y)](r - C'(~»f(€)d€ := 0 ,
which conveniently factors so that
(18) r = C'(~) .
Condition (18) is identical to the risk-neutral case, and it should be.
Investing in ~ gives a certain return of r; the error, €, is23
independent of investment effort, ~, and as a result e does not affect
Solving (,1'0 for I and substituting into u.6) the optimum contract
maximizes
with respect to r, where ~ = ~(r) satisfies u.8). The marginal
condition is
d~ !U'(·)[(V - C'(~» dr + e]f(e)de = 0
or in more compact notation
[v - C'(~)] d~ EU' + EeU' = 0 . dr
Solving ~9) yields the optimal r. Then the optimal I is found from
(17) •
Condition (19) does not lend itself to ready interpretation. However,
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all these changes imply corresponding changes in the marginal piece rate
r which influences investment through condition (18). The same changes
in V, sand C" have corresponding effects on the variance of income
(see (21» but an increase in
2
(J




large because it reduces r and increases I.
B. Optimum Prize Structure
The worker's expected utility in a two-player game is
(~2) E(U) = P[U(W1 - C(p*»] + (1- P)[U(W2 - C(p*»]
where * denotes the outcome of the contest rather than the piece-rate
scheme. The optimum prize structure is the solution to
(23) max P U(W1 - C(p*)
p*
+ (1 - P) U(W2 - C(p*) }
subject to the product market constraint
Vp* = PW + (1 - P)W 1 2
In maximizing (27) the worker sets oE(U) = 0
oll* . Since cost functions
are the same and and €k are i.i.d. the Nash solution implies
Pj = Pk and P = ~ as before, and the worker's investment criterion
simplifies to
(25 ) C'(].l*) =2[U(I) - U(2)]g(0)
U' (1) + U' (2)
where U(.) = U(W - C(ll*» •




and the optimum contract (W1,WZ) maximizes
(27) 1 1 EU* = 2" U(W1 - C(lJ*)) + 2" U(WZ - C(lJ*)) .
subject to (24), with P =~, and (26). Increasing marginal cost of
investment and risk-aversion (U" < 0) guarantees a unique maximum to
(27) when a Nash solution exists. Again, the marginal conditions are not
very revealing and second-order approximations are required. Assuming a




= W - C(Il*) Z
if
if
statics of (28) and (29) are similar
and
need not be repeated.
and 19
cov(€j'€k) =O. The comparative
to the piece rate (20) and (21) and26
C. Comparisons
Compare (21) to (29). This difference is rr (=3.14159) in the
denominator and numerator of ~9). This illustrates the proposition
piece rates produce an income with a lower variance
2 At high values of cr, the prize has a lower variance than e than
stated at the outset:
2 .;; - 1
(j <----"---
e: sC"(rr _ /;)
the prize.
For low values of 2 cr , e: specifically when
the piece rate. This, of course, does not imply that piece rates dominate
when 2 1;- 1 That would be true only if investment were the cr < e: sC" ('IT - /;)
same, but generally fl :f: fl*, so expected utility must be examined to
determine which scheme is best.
Since it is difficult to "nest" the two schemes analytically
we have constructed two examples which demonstrate the proposition
that piece rates dominate for low values of
and initially let the utility function be
while prizes dominate for
and v = 1, 2 e. 'V N(O,cr ),
J e
-U"/U' = 1. so U = -e-y
2 cr , e
2 = fl /2 We assume that C(fl) Z 20
cr • e high values of
Equations (25) , (27) and (28) are solved for WI' Wz' fl* and E(U*). Then
equations (19) , (17) and (15 ) are solved for r, I, fl and E(U). The
computations were carried for various values of
2 and the results out cr , e:
21




)l* E(U) - E(U*) (J )l
-f..
.5 .667 1.03 .275
1.5 .. 40 .678 .088
2.5 .285 .567 .029
3.0 .25 .532 .012
3.5 .222 .505 -.0008
6.5 .133 .413 -.041
8.0 .117 .395 -.051
The same was done for a utility function of the quadratic form,




)l* E(U) - E(U*) (J )l
-f..
.01 .999 .999 .021
1 .999 .993 2.12
100 .909 .614 92
150 .869 .514 61
200 .833 .443 -46.2
Both tables tell the same story. When (J2. 11· ~s sma p~ece rates
e:
2 dominate, but when (J goes above some level a prize yields the largest
e:
expected utility.
With risk-neutrality we showed that there is always a unique prize
structure that duplicates the resource allocation of the optimal piece-
rate wage structure: There, each compensation scheme yields the same
expected utility, and choice between them is on the basis of different
monitoring and observation costs. In this section, risk-aversion supplies28
another criterion for choice. Because the prize structure that duplicates
the investment of a piece rate structure has a different variance (and dis-
tribution in general), workers generally prefer one to the other: The ex-
pected utility of the optimal prize scheme does not, in general, equal the
expected utility of the optimal piece rate structure. In the examples in
Tables 1 and 2, piece rates dominate when luck is relatively unimportant
(o~ small) and prizes dominate when luck is more important (cr~ ,large).
This suggests perhaps, that high level executives, whose decisions may have
a large effect on output will have salaries which more closely parallel prizes.
Production workers, on the other hand, for whom





is likely to be low, will
An additional consideration affects the choice between piece rates and
tournaments. Let the worker be risk-averse and let cr2 be sufficiently small
E:
so that the piece rate optimum yields a higher expected utility. If there
is measurement error associated with gauging output, then the prize structure
may well dominate. Suppbse that the output estimator for worker i is
vit is random error, and Pt is common measurement error which is match-
specific but affects both workers similarly.23 For example, j and k may
have the same supervisor who always undervalues output. Or a mechanical
counting device might run too fast or too slow. This type of measurement
error affects the actual income variance in a piece rate scheme, but if
compensation is organized by prizes, the common measurement error drops out:
A A
qjt qkt = qjt - qkt + Vjt - vkt .29
The sign of is unaffected by Contest-specific measurement
error adds no noise to the tournament, but does contribute variance to
piece rate income. Therefore, if
structure may dominate even if




D. Skewed Earnings Distribution with Risk-Aversion
In the risk-neutral world, we obtained a positively skewed distribution
of income by ,introducing contests with eliminations. Skewed overall income
distributions fallout of the analysis with risk-aversion quite easily.
Suppose that there are two occupations, A and B, and that all





Assume for simplicity that costs of investment are the same in both
let it be the case that as the result of the
2
> cr B. Further,
E:
a piece rate
2 is inherently riskier, i.e., cr A
E:
risk differences,
A occupations, but that
Those in B end up with income that reflects the distribution of
scheme is optimal for B, whereas the prize scheme is optimal for A.
B
E: • If




I + r].l 2 2 and variance r cr B. Those in A receive incomes of
E:
Since A is inherently riskier than B, the expected
utility associated with A is lower than that for B at any common V.
Therefore, relative supplies of workers must adjust to increase the value
of services in A until expected utilities are equal across occupations.
This implies that the mean income in A must exceed the mean in B to
compensate for the additional risk. The distribution of income for both
groups is shown in Figure 2:because
30
The overall distribution is the sum of a normal and a binomial, weighted
by the number of individuals in each occupation. It is positively skewed
_A _B
Y > Y .
This result is reminiscent of a paper by Friedman (1951) on social
arrangements producing income distributions that satisfy workers' risk
preferences. It demonstrated how a Friedman-Savage utility function leads
to a two-class income distribution: Those people who are risk-averse are
assigned to relatively safe occupations, where income follows productivity;
whereas those with preferences for gambles buy lottery tickets in very risky
occupations where a small number win very large prizes. The overall
distribution is the sum of the two and exhibits skewness in the right tail.
While Friedman's work is a remarkable precursor to more recent treatments,
it is flawed by inadequate attention to the problem of moral hazard or
incentive. When the role of incentives is modeled more completely we31
obtain a similar result with only risk-aversion, since the optimum contract
is a tournament if the underlying distribution of outcomes has a large
variance.
V. HETEROGENEOUS CONTESTANTS
Workers are not sprinkled randomly across firms, but rather seem to be
sorted by ability levels. One explanation for this has to do with comple-
mentarities in production. But even in the absence of such complementarities,
sorting may be an integral part of optimal labor contract arrangements.
Therefore, this section analyzes tournament structures in the risk-neutral
case when investment costs differ among persons. Two types of persons are
assumed, a's and b's - , with marginal costs of the a's being smaller than
that of the b's: C~(~) <Cb(~) for all ~. The distribution of distur-
bances f(e) is assumed to be the same for both groups. Many of the fol-
lowing results continue to hold, with usually obvious modification of the
arguments, if the a's and b's draw from different distributions. Part
A addresses the question of self-selection and part B discusses handicap
systems.
A. Adverse Selection
Suppose eac~ person knows which class he belongs to, but that this infor-
mation is not available to any player or firm. The principal result is that
the a's and b's do not self-sort into their own "leagues." Rather every-
one prefers to play in the "major leagues;" all workers prefer to work in firms
with the best workers, even in the absence of production complementarities.
Furthermore, there is no price rationing mechanism that induces Pareto
optimal self-selection, andmixed play is inefficient because it cannot32
sustain the efficient investment strategies. Therefore tournament
structures naturally require credentials and other nonprice signals to
differentiate people and assign them to the appropriate contest. Firms
will select their employees based upon some initial information and all
are not permitted to enter.
The proof of adverse selection is to assume "pure" contests a - a
and b - b and demonstrate that they are not viable. We know from
Section II that if a's play each other and b's play each other the
outcomes are efficient, since V = C~(~a) = Cb(~b). Suppose the market
is organized and sorted into separate a contests and b contests
satisfying Section II and contemplate which contest a given person, whether
an ~ or Q.., would choose to enter.
If a person has an arbitrary investment level ~. expected gross
revenue from entering league i = a,b is
(30) R = wi + (Wi
i 2 1
i = a,b
are winning and i i Wi where P is the probability of winning and WI' 2





where is the existing players' (the
opponents') investment in that league, satisfying V = C ~ (~~) •
~ ~
In
equilibrium W~ - W~ = V!g(O), from equation (12), in both leagues and
Wi = V~. - V/2g(O), from (11). Substitution into (30) yields 2 ~
(31) i = a,b.
Several properties of 81) follow from Section II. First,
There is higher quality play in a - a which supports a larger total
purse and the spread is the same in both leagues. Second, sinceG'(·) = g(.)
33
is symmetric with a maximum of g(O), G(~ _ ~~) = pi has
1
an inflection point at Third, since G(O) = 1/2, direct evaluation
of (36) shows that The functions
and Rb(~) are graphed in Figure 3. Both have a logistic appearance
because is a cdf. They lie above the line to the left
imply that The §.-league at every level of
of ~~
1 and below it to the right.
exceeds
The inflection points at
24
~.
~* a and ~* b
dominates the E.-league from the standpoint of a potential entrant no matter
what the cost function. All workers prefer to work in the higher quality
firm with higher stakes, even though their probability of winning is lower
there. At a given investment the probability of winning is larger in b
than a because the contestants are not as talented on average. But
the larger stakes in the §.-league more than offset the smaller probabi-
lity of winning there. Now if free entry into the §.-league is allowed,
everyone chooses it and the average quality of play cannot support the
R. (~)
1
~* b ~* a
Figure 3separating equilibrium prize money (W~, W;) because total product is
contaminated by lower quality b's. The market structure collapses and
the assumed optimal separation is contradicted.
Since the demand for participation in b contests is effectively
zero, the obvious question is whether price rationing alone can achieve
market separation. The answer is no. The reason is that a single price
must be charged to all possible entrants, take it or leave it, because
the a's and b's cannot be recognized in advance. Yet a single price
does not give any differential incentives for either a's or b's to
enter the ~-league.
Again, initially assume separation and consider a ~-person who
invested ~ and contemplates jumping into the a-league. From (31) the
expected gain in income in a over b is
Similarly, the gain to an ~-person who, having committed investment ~:'
contemplates going from league b to league a is
But G(~* - ~*) = 1 - G(~* - ~*} b a a b so that The expected
gain from participation in league a to either an a or a b is the same
when both invest at their social optimum levels. Therefore any entrance
fee (over and above the gamble) has the same deterrent effect on entry for
either a's or b's. In particular, the price that absolutely deters b's
from entry also deters all of the a's. Of course, if a b anticipated
crashing an ~ contest he would do better by investing less than ~~.35
That ~ould only make him a more eager participant, even a larger price
deterrent ~ould be necessary to keep him out and that surely turns a~ay
the a's.
If the price mechanism and pure self-interest do not separate markets
when cost information is asymmetric, does competitive equilibrium in mixed
firms yield the proper investment incentives? Generally the answer is no.
Suppose the proportion of ~'s in the population is .kno~ by everyone
to be a and the pairings are random so the chance of playing an ais a
and the chance of playing a b is (1 - a). Let the prizes in mixed play
P the probability of ~inning if matched against an a a
and Pb the ~inning probability if matched against a b. Expected utility
of a player of type i is
Wz + (aP~ + (1 - a )P~) (W
l





Where pi is the probability of a win for a player of type i when he
a
opposes an a, and similarly for






(l - cpiJ b -
~)ClJi (WI - W Z) = C~ (J.l.)
~ ~
A development similar to Section II reveals that in equilibrium 02) becomes
(ag(O) + (1 - a)g(~a - ~b)J(W1 - W Z) =
( 33) for a's and
c' (~ ) a a
for b Is.
Again, only spread matters for invest~ent decisions.
It is not entirely clear what competitive eqUilibrium looks like in
mixed contests when players' types are unknown, but perhaps a case can be36
made that the net value of output is maximized subject to a zero profit
constraint and the Nash behavior implicit in (33). The chances of pairings
tively. Therefore expected product is
of a - a, a - b, and b - bare
2
a , 2a(l - a) and
211 a2 + 2a(l - a
2 (1 - a) respec-
2 2(1 - a) ~b = 2[alla + (1 - a)~b] and the zero profit constraint is
The net value of output is
so the equilibrium maximizes (35) with respect to WI and W 2 subject to
(33) and (34).
The first-order condition for the optimal spread ~W - WI
by differentiating (35):
W 2 is found
(36)
Though the solution v = C'(~ ) = C'(~) a a b . 0 satisfies (36), examination of (33)
shows that it violates the equilibrium investment strategies except possibly
when a =~. In fact, the solution with mixed players is efficient only
when a =~. In that case, the optimal spread is given by ~W = V/(g(O) +
g(ll: - u~»/2. This is larger than the spread in pure contests because both
players invest less in mixed than pure play at any given spread. The spread
must be larger to induce greater investment. In all other cases, one type
of player overinvests and the other underinvests to satisfy (36), because37
a~a/a6W and a~b/a6W are positive. Therefore a mixed league with no cost
revelation is almost always inefficient. Equation (33) implies that the a's
underinvest and the b's overinvest when a < ~ and the opposite is true
when a > ~.
We are led to the unalterable conclusion that a pure price system
cannot sustain an efficient competitive equilibrium in the presence of
population heterogeneity and private information. This does not say that
price competition cannot separate markets, but it does imply that if markets
are separated on the basis of price incentives alone then they must be
inefficient. It is easy to produce an example of such an equilibrum. The
a's want to differentiate themselves from the b's because they are
potentially more productive. Consider the following two contests. In one
the prize structure is set up as in Section II, equations (11) and (12).
In the other there is a much larger spread and a smaller losing prize.
Following the development of the first part of this section, assume that
only b's are attracted to the first type of contest and only a's to the
second. The situation is shown in Figure 4. The curve labeled R1(~) is
the expected payoff from entering the first type of contest at investment
~ and is identical to ~(~) in Figure 3. R2(~) is the expected payoff
to entering a contest with greater spread and smaller losing prize. It is
therefore steeper than R (~) a in Figure 3 and has a smaller intercept than
In distinction to Figure 3 where R (~) a everywhere dominated
for larger values. The overall return function is therefore the upper
envelope of these two curves. As illustrated, the b's find it optimal


















which exceeds J.l*. a These values satisfy zero profit because R (J.l*) = Vj.I* 1 b b
and That is, in order to differentiate themselves the a's
must overinvest and engage in a gamble with larger variance (cf. Aker10ff
(1978) for a similar kind of result in other contexts). This example
bears a family resemblance to the work of Rothchild and Stiglitz (1977),
Wilson (1978), and Riley (1975) on adverse selection in inSurance markets. We
.know from that work (and it is obvious from construction of Figure 4) that a
separating equilibrium need not exist; but difficulties remain even when it does:
(1) The equilibrium in Figure 4 may be less efficient than a
nonseparating equilibrium with mixed play.
(2) This type of separation may not be sustainable against a broader
set of strategies. To elaborate (this point also applies to the insurance39
problem), suppose the leagues and prizes are set up as in Figure 4 with
players "signing" into a league prior to committing investment. The mere
act of signing into league 1 or 2 therefore reveals their type. But once
types are revealed all those labeled as a's can gain from trade: There
are post-signing incentives to set up yet another league that satisfies
conditions (11) and (12) for that yields higher rents for the a's than
league 2 and no game in league 2 is ever played. If that happens no b
signs up in league 1, knowing that signing in the "dummy" league 2 labels
him an a and ultimately entitles participation in what appears to be a
dominant game, as in Figure 3. This behavior, akin to a time inconsistency,
unravels the two-league structure and separation is not achieved.
The practical resolution of these difficulties, which has its obvious
counterpart in the structure of real-life tournaments, is the use of
nonprice rationing and certification to sort people into the appropriate
games, based on past performances. Similarly, firms use nonprice factors
in allocating jobs among applicants. Presumably the market solves a
complicated experimental design problem, perhaps with a hierarchical
structure, that elicits this information in an efficient manner. The
issues are similar to those sketched in Section III.B.
Upon reflection, it is not terribly paradoxical that price information
alone does not allocate resources efficiently in these circumstances and
that nonprice rationing can be more effective. After all, only a fool or
a person with tastes for random dissipation of his wealth would examine
only the price of a transaction when there is a nontrivial probability of
misrepresentation of the other terms. That nonprice factors are
ubiquitous in labor markets is recognized in the theory of equalizing
differences. For practical examples of nonprice rationing one need go no40
further than the problem of allocating academic economists to departments.
Yet there appears to be a special problem with tournament structures that
should be pointed out. Strictly speaking, in the formal model above there
is no social value of sorting inherent in the technology, since total
output is the sum of independent outputs of all the workers. The tournament
introduces a socially contrived dependence through strategic factors
involved with attempting to improve one's chance of winning, for which
relative output is crucial. The independence of production implies that
sorting is no problem in the piece rate solution when workers are risk-
neutral: It makes no difference who works with whom because rewards are
based on independent individual performance?5 Of course, there would be
productive value of sorting if the objective function were not summable,
e.g., V(qj,qk) or the order statistic example in Section III.C instead
of V· (qj + qk). Nevertheless, the above differences may suggest that
stratification and sorting present greater difficulties for tournaments
than for individual performance-geared incentive schemes. Still,
tournaments may be the socially efficient arrangement if rank is easier
to observe than is individual performance.
B.Handicap Systems
This section moves to the opposite extreme of the previous discussion
and assumes that the identities of each type of player are known to everyone.
Gambles involving N players of known talent are said to be fair if each
player has win probability of liN. When the quality of play is drawn out
of fixed distributions that differ among players, fairness is achieved by
handicaps that equalize the upper liN quantiles of the various41
distributions; e.g., with N = 2 the weaker player is given "points" to
equalize the medians. It is surprising that this criterion of fairness
fails to hold true in competitive markets where prizes affect probability
distributions and the gambles are productive: The market clearing handicap
implies less than full equalization so that the better player always has a
competitive edge.
Consider again two types a and b now known to everyone. Prize
structures in a - a and b - b tournaments satisfying (11) and (12) are
efficient, but those conditions are not optimal in mixed a - b play.
Denote the socially optimal levels of investment by lJ* and lJ~, their a
difference by LllJ, and the prizes in a mixed league by WI and W
2
, Let
h be the handicap awarded to b with LllJ ~ h ~ O. Then the Nash solution
in the a - b tournament satisfies
C' (lJ ) a a
(37)
(The second condition in (37) follows from symmetry of g(~).) Since
independence of outcomes implies no social preference for alternative
structures when revenues are additive, the efficient investment criterion
is v = C'(lJ*) = C' (u:k) a a b . b ' independent of pairings, Therefore from (37)
the optimum spread in a mixed match must be
(38) LlW = V/g(LllJ - h)
to induce proper investments by both contestants. The spread is larger
in mixed than pure contests unless a gives b the full handicap42
h = ~~ - ~~. Otherwise, the appropriate spread is a decreasing function of
h. - - - and W z must also satisfy the zero profit constraint WI + W z =
v . (~~ + ~~) independent of h since the spread is always adjusted to
induce investments ~~ and ~~.
The gain to an a from playing a b with handicap h rather than
another a with no handicap is the difference in expected prizes since
costs are the same in all matches C (~*): a a
Y (h) a
where P = G(A~ - h) is the probability that a wins the mixed match.
The corresponding expression for b is
The zero profit constraints in a - a, a - band b - b imply that
ya(h) + yb(h) = 0 for all admissible h; so the gain of playing mixed
matches to a is completely offset by the loss to b and vice versa.
If Ca(~) is not greatly different from Cb(~) then
A~ = ~: - ~~ is small and P ~t + g(A~ - h). This approximation and
the zero profit constraint reduce (39) to
(41) Y (h) ~ -VA~r:i _ g(O) (l _ J!.)l
a l: g(A~ - h) A~J
The expression for yb(h) is the same except for the absence of the minus
sign in front of VA~. y~(h) = -yb(h) < 0 so the gain to a decreases in
h and the gain to l increases in h. Moreover,Y (0) = Vt.].l [g(O) - 1] > 0 and Y (t.].l) = -Vt.].l/2. Therefore there exists a g(t.].l) 2 a
a unique h* satisfying Ya(h*) = yb(h*) = 0 and 0 < h* < t.].l.
If the actual handicap is less than h*, a's prefer to play in mixed
contests rather than with their own type while b's prefer to play with
~'s only. The opposite is true if h > h*. Since the gain to the one is
the loss to the other, side payments and guarantees could induce b's to
play against a's in the first case and a's to play against b's in the
second. However, side payments are unnecessary when h = h*, for then no
one cares who they are matched against. Therefore h* is the competitive
market clearing handicap and the condition 0 < h* < t.].l implies that it is
less than full. The a's are given a compe~itive edge in equilibrium,
- 1 1 p ~ 2 + g(t.].l - h*) > 2 because they contribute~ to total output in
mixed matches than the b's do. This same result holds if € has a a
different variance than €b' but may be sensitive to the assumption of
statistical independence and output additivity.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes an alternative to compensation in proportion to
marginal product. Under certain conditions, the new scheme yields ~~ allo-
cation of resources identical to that generated by the efficient piece rate.
By compensating workers on the basis of their relative position in the firm,
one can produce the same incentive structure for risk neutral workers that
the optimal piece rate produces. It might be less costly, however, to
observe relative position than to measure the level of each worker's output
directly. This would result in paying salaries which resemble "prizes";
wages which for some workers greatly exceed their presumed marginal products.44
When risk aversion is introduced~theprize salary structure no longer
duplicates the allocation of resources induced by the optimal piece rate.
For activities which have a high degree of inherent riskiness~ contests will
tend to dominate. For sufficiently small levels of inherent riskiness~ the
competitive piece rate tends to dominate. Given risk aversion~ a positively
skewed overall distribution of income is the natural outcome of the mixing
of the distribution of income for those paid prizes with that for those paid
piece rates.
Finally, we allow workers to be heterogeneous. This complication adds
an important result: Competitive contests will not, in general, sort workers
in a way which yields an efficient allocation of resources. In particular,
low quality workers will attempt to contaminate the firm comprised of high
quality workers, even if there are no complementarities in production. This
contamination results in a general breakdown of the efficient solution if
low quality workers are not prevented from entering. This is, therefore, one
rationalization for the use by high quality firms of initial credentials when
allocating jobs to applicants.45
FOOTNOTES
1. This statement needs qualification. For example, annual bonuses may
depend on group measures such as total profits of the firm, but not on
rank order of workers within each labor category.
2. Virtually all the results of this paper hold true if the error structure
is multiplicative rather than additive, but the exposition is slightly
less convenient in the case.
3. Throughout the analysis, we assume that the worker has control only over
~. A more general specification would allow him to affect the variance
of E. Although this will not alter the solution in the risk neutral
case, risk averse workers might sacrifice ~ for lower variance of E.
This problem, of inducing the worker to avoid cautious strategies, is
one which we do not analyze here.
4. A nonlinear piece rate schedule r(q) provides the correct marginal
incentives so long as r'(q) =V at equilibrium. It is clear that a
one-parameter linear piece rate is the competitive solution in this
case, since nonlinearities or two-part tariffs can only transfer
inframarginal rents to employers, thus violating the zero profit
condition. A one-parameter piece rate is definitely nonoptimal in
the presence of risk aversion. See below.
5. Since a~P = g(~j -~) and g(.) is a pdf, a2P/a~~ = g'(~j - ~k)
j
may be positive and fulfillment of second-order conditions in (5) may
imply sharp breaks~in the reaction function. See the appendix for
elaboration.46
6. With normal errors (12) and (8) imply
The ratio of the spread to the mean prize is proportional to the
coefficient of variation of output. This formula also applies to
N
an N-player game with W N replacing W 2 in the numerator and rWi/N
in the denominator.
7. Of course, in a full analysis any change in costs of all participants
would change industry supply and therefore alter V, but those
qualifications are straightforward.
8. Lazear (1979, 1979a) uses this notion in a deterministic but dYnamic
setting. By paying an individual more than his marginal product later
in life, and less than marginal product earlier in life, one induces
optimal effort and investment behavior throughout the worker's lifetime.
9. Of course, the risk is diversifiable across workers and therefore by
firms. One might also think that risks could therefore be pooled
among groups of workers through, say, sharing agreements, but that
is false because of moral hazard. A worker would never agree to share
prizes since doing so (completely) results in ~ = 0 so that E(qj + qk) = O.
As the result, firms offering tournaments' or piece-rates in the pure sense
yield higher expected utility than the sharing arrangement.
10. There is some discussion of contests in the statistics literature for
the method of paired comparisons. Samples from different populations
are compared pairwise and the object is to choose the one with the
largest mean. If all pairs are compared, the experimental design is
similar to a round-robin tournament. An alternative design is a47
knockout tournament with single or double elimination, which does not
generate as much information as the round-robin but which requires
fewer samples and is cheaper. These problems are discussed by David (1963)
and Gibbons, Olkin and Sobel (1977), but are not helpful here because
they assume fixed populations, whereas the essence of our problem is
to choose an experimental design and payoff mechanism that induces
players to choose the correct distributions to draw from. A complete
treatment would add the additional complexity of allowing investment
strategies to change as new information becomes available.
11. With the current technology and risk neutral workers, there is no
advantage to being able to distinguish the best from second-best,
etc. The motivation for this analysis comes from considering other
payoff structures where level is important in nonadditive ways. A
multiplicative technology, where revenue equals Vf(qjqk), for example,
implies that sorting of workers is important. Similarly, a payoff
which depends on the level of the highest output individual may also
require sorting. This latter case is discussed below in another context.
12. Strictly speaking, the production variables in the two-period problem
should be rescaled to make the outcomes identical with Section II, but
that is a detail.
13. See Lazear (1979) for additional details.
14. Economies of joint consumption, in some activities such as performance,
may imply very large rewards to a small number of people. To a
potential entrant the game might look like a lottery based on rank
order and it may appear as if consumers value rank perse. See Rosen
(1979) for elaboration.48
15. We are indebted to George Stigler for this reference. There is a
well-known paper by Mosteller (1951) on how many games must be played
before one is fairly certain that the best team emerges victorious,
as well as the literature on paired comparisons referred to above,
but these are not directly relevant.
16. The following is similar to a problem analyzed by Stiglitz (1915). A
linear piece rate structure is a simplification. A more general
structure would allow for nonlinear piece rates (see Mirrlees, 1916).
A still more general model allows for the compensation scheme to be a
random variable. Prescott and Townsend (1919) consider this in the
11.
context of a selection problem.
Furthermore, r::: V/(l + sC"cr2) e:
r = V and I =° in the case of risk ·aversion, s = 0, as asserted
in Section II. All these approximations use first-order expansions
for terms in U'(.) and second-order expansions for terms in U(·).
The same is true of the approximations below for the tournament.
18. With N players and N prizes (WI the first place prize, W 2 second
N
place, etc.) equation (25) becomes C,(~) =k[U(l) - U(N)]/EU'(T), where
k is a constant. As in Section III.A, the numerator contains terms
only in first and last place prizes. But now the denominator contains
terms in all the other prizes as well, removing the source of indeter-
minacy of the entire prize structure that occurred in the risk-neutral
case.
19· Furthermore, C,(~*)::: g(O)(Wl - W 2), so the spread is still crucial
for investment incentives, as in the risk-neutral case.49
20. The following contract contains the prize and piece rates of Section
IV as special cases. Denote gross income by Y:
11 + rl qj if qj > qk
Y. = J
12 + r 2q
j
if qj < qk
The piece rate of Section IV is (Nl) with the additional constraints
and The prize is (Nl) with imposed.
It is not difficult to write down competitive equilibrium conditions
for contract (Nl) but they defy interpretation. Following the general
theorem that less constraints are better, (Nl) must be superior to
either piece rates or prizes in the case of risk ·aversion. In the risk-
neutral case all three are tied.
21. We have not verified that a Nash solution exists at each value of cr~
in the contest, but since existence is less likely for smaller values
of cr2 this cannot affect the conclusions drawn from these examples.
€:
22. In this context, no distinction is drawn between time rates and piece
rates. To the extent that time rates are dependent upon output level
over some time period, they fall into the piece rate category.
23. Pt must be match-specific and not firm-specific. A firm-specific error
that applied to all matches in that firm would lead to systematic bias.
If the firm survives, an efficient market would come to learn of the
bias and that would be fully adjusted in the piece rates or prizes it
offered, in the nature of an equalizing difference.
24. Expand G(~ - ~~)
~ around zero up to third order, the cubic being
necessary becaus.e g'(O) = 0 since g(F;) is synnnetric around O.50
Substitute into (36) to obtain
This difference exceeds zero for ]..1 > 0 since ]..1* > ]..1b* and g"( 0) < o.
- a
25. The qualification of risk neutrality is important. There is definitely
a sorting problem if workers are risk averse (see Stiglitz, 1975).51
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J's reaction function satisfies (5) and (6)
(w W)g'( ) - C"(".) < 0 1 - 2 llj - llk "J
g(llj - llk) is a symmetric function with mode at O. The Nash solution, if
there is one, implies llj :0 llk or C'(ll.)
J
and is unique.
Differentiate (AI) to obtain
Since g is symmetric the reaction function is positively sloped for
llj > llk and negatively sloped for llj < llk' Assume jj = ll. = llk is an
J
equilibrium satisfying (AI) . The difficulty is that llj = jj is a consistent
reply to II =ii, but may not be the best reply. Figure Al shows a case k
where it is the best reply and Figure A2 shows a case where it isn't.
Reaction functions for both j and k corresponding to each of these cases
are shown in Figures A3 and A4. Notice that the reaction functions are
discontinuous: Inflection points in g(llj - llk) imply there always exists
a value of llk at which there are two equally good replies by j satisfying
(AI), as is implicit in the construction of Figures Al and A2. It is
difficult to completely characterize all conditions that ensure equilibrium
because they do not involve marginal conditions. It is clear from Figures
Al and A2, however, that the variance in s cannot be too small for

















to maximize (13). The first-order condition
ap ap ap
(1\3) W _1 + W _2 + W _3 - C' (ll .) = 0
1 all. 2 all 0 3 all]o ]
] ]
As in Section II, we must evaluate the marginal effects of investment on the
probabilities. For example, j wins if or
and
Define ~k = £k - £j and ~t =£t - £j and denote the joint density of
(~k'~t) by ¢(~k'~t)· The ~'s have zero means, E(~k) = E(~t) = 0, but
nonzero covariance, E(~k ~t) = 20; +0, because of the common component
£j in both ~k and ~t. Define the skill or investment differences
between j and his opponents by and Then
the probability ,of win may be written
Similarly, the probability of show is
The probability of place is P2 = 1 - PI - P
3
. Finally, since the probabil~
ities add up to unity,
(A5)A2
The Nash solution, if it exists, implies ~j = ~k = ~t and
P = P = P = 1/3 for each player. Therefore Sk = Sn = 0 in equilibrium.
1 Z 3 "-
We now show that at equilibrium aPl/a~j = -aP3/a~j so that
apZ/dllj = 0 in order to satisfy (4.5·). Refer to Figure Itt, The ellipses
show the probability contours of </>·(i;;kfi;;t). This joint pdf is symmetric
because E: .', E:k
and E:t
are Ll.d. But Sk = St = 0 in equilibrium, so
J
PI is the integral of </> over the third quadrant, P3 the integral over
the first quadrant and Pz
the inte-gral over the second and fourth
quadrants. Positive correlation between ~t and ~k makes all these
probabilities equal to 1/3. Suppose now that j makes an incremental
investment, given ~k and ~t' that increases Sk and St from 0 to
65k and 65t . Then PI rises by the integral of </>(~k'~t) over the two
shaded strips. By the same token, P
3
falls by integral over the two
unshaded strips. But since <I>(~k'~t) is symmetric, these integrals are
~ ~A3
equal and opposite in sign and P2 is unchanged. Therefore aP2/a~j = 0
and the optimum condition (A3) reduces to
~)
Finally) elementary manipulations.of (A4) imply
which is just the marginal density of ~k evaluated at ~k = O.
Substituting this into (A6) gives
i = j,k)i
which is virtually identical to equation (7) of Section II.
Note two things: First) Wz
does not appear in ~6). This is the
source of the indeterminacy. Any Wz
suffices so long as
1
V~ =3 [WI + Wz + W 3] ~ C(~j). Second) again only the win-show spread is
important in the determination of investment. The intuition is clear. A
risk-neutral player views games as equal so long as they have the same
expected value. Thus) increasing Wz and reducing WI and W
3
but
leaving (WI - W
3
) unchanged has no effect on the expected value of the
game. And because it leaves the spread between WI and W
3
unchanged)
it does not change the value of ~. It is) therefore) like a lump-sum tax
coupled with offsetting lump-sum subsidies) and does not affect behavior.
As mentioned in the text, the indeterminacy vanishes when risk-aversion
is introduced.